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COMPARISON OF CERTIFICATE POLICIES FOR-
MERGING PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURESDURING 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION OF COMPANIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) provides facilities for data encryption, digital signature and time 
stamping. It is a system where different authorities verify and authenticate the validity of each partici-
pant with the use of digital certificates. A Certificate Policy (CP) is a named set of rules and it indicates 
the applicability of a certificate in a Public Key Infrastructure. Sometimes two companies or organiza-
tions with different PKIs merge. Therefore it would be necessary that their PKIs  are also able to merge. 
Sometimes, the unification of different PKIs is not possible because of the different certificate policies. 
This paper presents a method to compare and assess certificate policies during merger and acquisition 
of companies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to transmit critical data safely over the internet during e-commerce and e-business 
transactions,  robust and trustworthy security systems are required. Public Key Infrastruc-
ture(PKI) [1][2][3]is a security infrastructure that provides the necessary security services in 
enterprises. One of the main goals of PKI is the verification andauthenticationof  each partici-
pant in the business with the use of digital certificates. A Certificate Policy(CP) is a named set 
of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of 
application with common security requirements.  An X.509 Version 3 certificate may identify a 
specific applicable CP, which may be used by a relying party to decide whether or not to trust a 
certificate, associated public key, or any digital signature verified using the public key for a 
particular purpose. A Certificate Practice Statement (CPS)states how a certificate authority im-
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plements a CP[4]. They have a commonoutline, as indicated in the IETF Request for Com-
ments(RFC)3647 [5] or in the older version, RFC2527 [6]. The policy indicates the PKI certifi-
cates' profile and the architecturalstructure of the underlying trusted third party. Thus a certifi-
cate authority issues acertificate to an end user with a specific certificate policy[7]. If different 
end userswith different domains want to establish a secure communication, they need to find 
away to trust each other. That means, their certificates need to follow thesame standard. X.509 
is a standard that specifies the standard format for the certificates, the certificate revocation lists 
and the certificate path validation algorithm. 
 
When users from different domains want to communicate,  interoperability between PKIs is a 
major issue to be considered. Interoperability between PKIs makes possible the secureintercon-
nection and co-operation between different PKI structures.PKI interoperability is usually ad-
dressed through the cross-certification service, whichcan be described as the way to establish 
chains of trust between different certificationauthorities (CAs)[8][9][10]. However, cross-
certification is not yet technically providedin an automated way, resulting often in a difficult 
and time-consuming paper-basedprocess, which reduces the flexibility and usability of the me-
thod itself. The lackof automated cross-certification is largely due to the inadequate standardi-
zation ofthe certificate policies (CP), which define the PKI certificates’ profile and, thus, 
formthe basic comparison criteria for the mutual acceptance of CAs[6]. More specifical-
ly,although the CP structure is defined in some of the existing standards[11-16], there is stilla 
significant gap in the standardization of the CP content (e.g., roles of the involvedsubjects, cer-
tification and registration requirements etc.). In addition, there is nosystemized way for the de-
velopment and the comparison of CPs, thus making theircomparative analysis a difficult task. 
The above restrictions together with the lackof the necessary legal/regulatory PKI harmoniza-
tion[17], disable the automated CPcomparison, obstructing in this way the automation of the 
overall cross-certificationservice and, thus, making difficult the secure electronic co-operation, 
information ex-change and knowledge sharing. 
 
The trust depends upon the content of their certificates. In general, the certificatepolicy is op-
tional and is indicated as an extension fieldin the X.509 certificate. The policy extension field 
in the certificate indicates the policywith an object identifier (OID).  
 
1.1 Unification of Public Key Infrastructures 
 
When two or more business corporations are collaborated or during their acquisitions,  merging 
of their PKIs at the root  is a simple and straight forward approach[18][19]. This is the best so-
lution when the interoperability between  the PKIs is temporary and  dynamically change with 
the market requirements. The merging process needs to be low-cost, easily constructed and 
flexible. Figure 1 shows, the unification of two Hierarchical PKIs through cross certification. 
 
 
Figure  1. Merged Hierarchical PKIs with cross-certifications 
 
In order to merge two infrastructures, the certificate policies should be merged as well. If the 
certificate policies are different, the unification of PKIs is not allowed.  
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This paper is organizedin the following way: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the PKI 
components. Section 3 highlights  PKI models. Section 4 explains  certificate  policies, policy 
structure and their comparison by parsing process. Section 5 describes the formalization of the 
proposed method of certificate policy comparison and assessment to merge PKIs. Finally, sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. PKI COMPONENTS 
 
PKI consists of a number of components like certification authorities, registration authorities, 
repositories and users. The users of the PKI can be divided into different categories such as cer-
tificate holders and relying parties.  
 
• Certification authority (CA): The CA is the basic building block of the PKI. The CA 
confirms the identities of parties sending and receiving electronic payments or other 
communications. It is a collection of computer hardware, software and the people who 
operate it. The CA is known by two attributes[20]: its name and its public key. The CA 
performs 4 basic PKI functions: 1) Issues certificates(i.e. creates and signs them); 
2)Maintains certificate status information and issues Certificate Revocation 
Lists(CRLs). 3)Publishes its current(e.g. unexpired) certificates and CRLs, so users can 
obtain the information they need to implement security services and 4) Maintains arc-
hives of status information about the expired certificates that it issues. 
 
• Registration authority (RA): Once authentication is done by a CA it will ask the RA 
to register or vouch for the identity of users to a CA. The certificate contents are made 
in such a way that it will reflect the information presented by the requesting entity and 
sometimes they also reflect third party information. CA and RA are similar in a way 
that both contain computer hardware, software and an operator. But a small difference 
we can say that CA will be mostly operated by multi-user whereas RA will be often op-
erated by a single user. Each CA contains a list of its trustworthy RAs. CA identifies 
RA by a name and a public key. RAs signature on a message means that a CA which 
has a trustworthy relation with that RA can trust the message. So the RA should be pro-
viding an adequate protection for its own private key. 
 
• PKI Repository: It is a database for a CA where the digital certificates have been 
stored. When the users want to confirm the status of the digital certificate for any of the 
other reason they will contact the repository and the repository will in turn produces di-
gitally signed messages and will send back to the user. 
 
• PKI Users: PKI users are organizations or individuals that use the PKI. They rely on 
the other components of the PKI to obtain certificates, and to verify the certificates of 
other entities with whom they do business. End-entities include the relying party, who 
relies on the certificate to know with certainty the public key of another entity and the 
certificate holder, that issued a certificate and can sign digital documents. An individu-
al or organization may be both a relying party and a certificate holder for various appli-
cations. 
 
3. PKI MODELS 
PKI trust models are also referred to as PKI structures or PKI architectures. Different business 
corporations deploy different types of PKIs.  They are: Single CA, Hierarchical, Multirooted 
Hierarchical, Mesh , Bridgeand Hybridmodels. 
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3.1 Single CA PKI model 
As shown in Figure 2,  A Single CA PKI architecture is one that contains a single CA and pro-
vides the PKI services for all the users or the end entities (ENT1, ENT2, ENT3 and ENT4 in  
Figure 2) of the PKI. There is a single trust anchor that has to be trusted by all the users. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Single CA PKI architecture 
 
If the CA’s private key is compromised, the security of the entire system collapses. Even though 
this configuration is very easy to deploy, scalability is very poor if the community of users is 
very large. 
 
 
3.2 Hierarchical PKI model 
 
A Hierarchical PKI, as depicted in Figure 3, is one in which all of the subscribers / relying par-
ties trust a single CA. This CA is called Root CA (RCA in Figure 3) and is the most trusted 
anchor. The Root CA certifies the public keys of subordinate CAs. These CAs (CA1 and CA2 
in Figure 3) certify their subscribers or may, in a large PKI, certify other CAs. In this architec-
ture, certificates are issued in only one direction, and a CA never certifies another CA "supe-
rior" to itself. Typically, only one superior CA certifies each CA. Certificate path construction 
in a Hierarchical PKI is a straightforward process that simply requires the relying party to suc-
cessively retrieve issuer certificates until a certificate is located that was issued by the trusted 
root. Hierarchical PKIs are scalable; certification paths are easy to develop and certification 
paths are relatively short [23]. However, reliance on a single trust point may result in compro-
mise of the entire PKI. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Hierarchical PKI 
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3.3 Multi-Rooted Hierarchical PKI 
 
The multi-rooted Hierarchical PKI is used in popular web browsers. It is the widely used varia-
tion on the single-rooted Hierarchical PKI. As shown in Figure 4, a multi-rooted Hierarchical 
PKI is formed by inclusion of multiple root CAs as a trust list. As far as certificate validation is 
concerned, there is no much difference between single-rooted Hierarchical PKI and multi-
rooted Hierarchical PKI.  The difference is that a certificate will be accepted only if it can be 
verified back to any of the set of trust anchors in the trust list.   
 
This scheme has some drawbacks as well. This approach is suitable only for applications 
wherein the number of certificate verifications is limited, otherwise it may introduce certain 
security vulnerabilities[25].  Users should have proper idea of the certificate policies and oper-
ating practices of the various trust anchors. Also they must be aware of which root was used to 
verify a given certificate.  Additionally, the compromise of any trusted CA private  key or the 
insertion of an unwanted CA certificate to the trust list may  compromise the entire system.  
This can be an efficient solution for certificate path verification only if the trust list is properly 
managed and kept to a reasonable size. 
 
 
Figure 4. A multi-Rooted Hierarchical PKI 
 
 
3.4 Mesh PKI model 
 
A PKI constructed with peer-to-peer CA relationships is called a Mesh PKI or a “web of 
trust”[5]. In a mesh style PKI, as depicted in Figure 5, each subscriber trusts its own CA. The 
CAs in this environment have no superior/ subordinate relationship. In a mesh, CAs in the PKI 
cross certify each other. Figure 5 depicts a mesh PKI that is fully cross-certified, however, it is 
possible to construct and deploy a mesh PKI with a mixture of unidirectional and cross-
certifications[26]. Compromise of a single CA cannot bring down the entire PKI. Mesh PKIs 
can easily incorporate a community of users. However, certification path construction in a mesh 
PKI is more complex than in a Hierarchical PKI due to the likely existence of multiple paths 
between a relying party’s trust anchor and the certificate to be verified, and the potential for 
loops and cycles in non-hierarchical certificate graphs. 
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Figure 5. A Mesh PKI 
 
3.5 Hybrid PKI model 
 
Hybrid PKI is theinterconnection of different PKIs via cross certification. This enables relying 
parties of each to verify and accept certificates issued by the other PKI[27]. If the interconnec-
tion is between only Hierarchical PKIs, Root CAs of all the participating PKIs cross-certify 
each other facilitating interoperability between PKIs.  Similarly, if the PKIs are mesh style, then 
a CA within each PKI is selected, more or less arbitrarily, to establish the cross-certification. 
This results in the creation of a larger mesh PKI. However, the participating PKIs need not be 
of the same type. Figure 6 depicts a hybrid situation resulting from a Hierarchical PKI cross-
certifying a mesh PKI. 
 
Figure 6. A Hybrid PKI 
 
As the number of cross certified PKIs grows, the number of relationships between them grows 
exponentially resulting in complex certificate path verification. 
 
3.6 Bridge PKI model 
 
Another approach to the interconnection of PKIs is the use of a “bridge” certification authority 
(BCA). A BCA architecture was designed to address the shortcoming of Hierarchical and Mesh 
PKIs [28]. A BCA connects multiple PKIs to establish trust paths among them. The BCA is not 
intended to be used as a trust point by the users of the PKI. As shown in the Figure 7, the BCA  
cross-certifies with one CA (known as a “principal” CA [PCA]) in each participating PKI. 
 
Figure 7. Bridge PKI 
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Since each PKI only cross-certifies with one other entity (i.e., the BCA), and the BCA cross-
certifies only once with each participating PKI, the number of relationships in this environment 
grows linearly with the number of PKIs resulting in certification path discovery easier than 
mesh PKI. However, the certification path discovery in Bridge PKI model is more difficult than 
Hierarchical PKI. The sole purpose of BCA is to establish trust relationships between different 
PKIs. It is not considered as a trust point, rather it is considered as a trust arbitrator. The new 
CAs can be added just by a pair of certificates between BCA and the new CA itself.  
 
In general, none of these architectures is perfect for all situations. Single CA PKI has the draw-
back of relying on a single CA. In a Hierarchical PKI model, certificate path is unidirectional, 
so certificate path development and validation is simple and straight forward. However, if the 
root CA is compromised, which is everyone's trust point, the security of the whole system col-
lapses. Mesh architecture is also widely used in applications such as MANET, but certificate 
path development is more complex than in a hierarchy. Unlike a hierarchy, building a certificate 
path from a user's certificate to a trust point is nondeterministic. The Bridge Certification Au-
thority (BCA) architecture was designed to address the shortcomings of the Hierarchical and 
Mesh PKI architectures, and to link PKIs that implement different architectures, but certificate 
path discovery is not simple. Since Hybrid PKI is the mixture of different PKI architectures, the 
complexity of certificate path verification increases.  
 
Therefore, the people who deploy PKI should choose the best architecture that is suited to their 
enterprise situation. A single CA is appropriate for a small community. A Hierarchical PKI is 
best suited to organizations with a well-defined structure. For organizations with no well-
defined structure, a mesh PKI is the ideal one. Once the population increases, a bridge CA may 
be deployed but with extra effort to set up bridge CAs. 
 
4. CERTIFICATE POLICIES AND THEIR COMPARISON 
 
In  a Public Key Infrastructure, a certificate authority issues an end user, an X.509 version 3 
certificate according to one or more given certificate policies. Assume that there are two differ-
ent companies, each with its own PKI and they like to merge and unify their infrastruc-
tures[20][21]. For that, they have to establish a connection between the two different domains. 
Cross certification is a possible solution. If the certificate policies are different,policy mapping 
is a solution to establish secure communication through unified domains. Issues regarding un-
ification of the policies is mentioned in  RFC 3647[5].  This paper describes the problems and 
the solution approaches for it. We explain a procedure for comparison and assessment of Certi-
ficatePolicies[22]. The methodis to calculate a compatibility score, which is the base to decide 
if the unification of the PKIs is possible or not. If unification is possible, a prototype of a uni-
fied certificate policy for the merging companies can be created. The CPs must be standardized 
before they can be compared. Throughout the paper, wherever the term “certificate policy” is 
mentioned, it is assumed that  the certificate policy is the standardized one. The standardized 
certificate policy file is in the TXT format that can be the input for a simple parsing process. 
The content of the Certificate Policy is divided into paragraphs, subparagraphs, options, con-
nectives etc. 
 
First of all, the outline of the certificate policies will be parsed. Thecomparison of these CP out-
lines of different PKIs is possible by parsing. The parsing is carriedout according to some syn-
tactical rules. Parsing the outline of certificate policies isproposed in RFC 3647[5]. Two CPs 
are parsed and compared. Based on the degree ofcomparisona compatibilityscore is calculated 
which is described in section V. The Figure 8shows the flowgraph of the parsing process.  
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Figure 8. Flowgraph of the parsing process 
 
As shown in Figure 8, the CPs of two PKIs are taken as the input for the parsing process and 
different tokens from each CP are stored in a tree data structure for comparison. Based on the 
compatibility score, a prototype of a unified certificate policy for the merging PKIs will be 
created. 
 
4.1 Parsing Certificate Policies 
 
A certificate policy is prepared in the TXT format. The following lines represent a part of a typ-
ical certificate policy. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview  
//Gives an overview about the document 
1.2 Document name and identification  
a ) RECOMMENDED Document name 
b) MUST Designated identification 
Connection AND 
1.3 PKI participants  
//Described in the subsections 
1.3.1 Certification authorities 
a ) Issues certificates to end users 
b) Issues certificates to other users 
1.3.1.1 Root authorities 
a ) Specifies the difference  to the CAs 
1.3.2 Registration authorities 
1.3.3 Subscribers 
1.3.4 . . . 
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In order to parse a certificate policy, it is represented in Backus Naur Form(BNF) or Extended 
Backus Naur Form(EBNF)[29].  The syntax of the certificate policy is described in Extended 
Backus Naur Formnotation in the followingway: 
 
 CertificatePolicy = {Section} 
 Section = Point{MainSection | SubSection} 
 Point = Number " . "  
 MainSection = {CapitalLetter ["("Number")"]} [Weight ] "\n" Content  
 SubSection = {Point} Number String [Weight ] "\n" Content  
 Number = Integer  
 Weight = Integer  
 Content = {Option | [ Connection ]}|{Extension} 
 Option = [letter ")" ] [ Keyword ] String "\n"  
 Connection = "connection" ("AND" |"OR")  
 Extension = Subsection  
 Keyword = "MUST" | "RECOMMENDED" | "OPTIONAL" | "NOT"  
 
A symbol can either be a number, a dot or a string. Number means the enumerationof the cur-
rent paragraph or the subparagraph, and the string stands for the currenttitle of the paragraph. 
The dot is used as the separator in an enumeration. Theparser will check both the title and con-
tent of a paragraph. After parsing the certificate policies, the tokens arestored in designated data 
structures. Two data structures "Token" and "TokenList" are introduced. "Token" represents a 
simple entry, "TokenList" contains all entries in the same level under a section,e.g. the main 
token list, which contains all main sections. At the end the content ofa certificate policy  is 
stored as a tree data structure as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Tree structure representing a certificate policy 
 
 
5. FORMALIZATION OF CP COMPARISON AND ASSESSMENT 
 
The CP comparison and assessment tool is developed in Java with OpenSSL and NetBeans 
6.7.1 as the IDE. In the implementation, a token represents a  paragraph and a token list 
represents the list of paragraphs. Under every paragraph there are  subparagraphs and up to four 
levels of indexing is considered.  A Token list is a collection of tokens. Let PA be an arbitrary 
paragraph of a standardized certificate policy of an entity A and PB be the corresponding para-
graph of the policy of entity B. Si is the score of a paragraph(token) i in a list. li is the score of 
the subparagraphs(list) under the paragraph i, with i = 1, ...,N where N is the number of para-
graphs. Ojkrefers to the provisional result of the equality of option j of PA with option k of PB. vj 
refers to the keyword value of option j in PA, and vkis the keyword value of option k in PB. Each 
option in the paragraph of policy A is compared with the same paragraph of B's policy. Basical-
ly, the value of Ojkis 100 if the corresponding  options in both the policies are same and 0 if 
they are different. In general,   
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5.1 Weight of a paragraph 
 
The updated weight of a paragraph idepends upon the  size of the TokenList.  If there are many 
elements in the paragraph, i.e., if the size of the TokenList is large, the updated token score gets 
lessweight as shown in equation (1). 
 
Si = (Si+li*N)/(1+N)    (1) 
 
For example,  
If the original paragraph score, Si,  is 100,subparagraph score is 75 and the number of ele-
ments(subparagraphs) under that paragraph is 2, then the updated score is  
 
Si=(100+75*2)/(1+2)=83.3 
 
If the number of elements is increased to 8, then 
 
Si =(100+75*8)/(1+8)=77.8 
 
Thus, as the number of elements increase, the paragraph weight decreases. 
 
5.2 Merging PKIs based on policies 
 
The calculation of the score of a token depends upon the following two situations: 
• PA has some options, PB has no options: 
 
 In this case, merging A and B with cross certification is not allowedsince the score Si 
is0.  
 
However, if A acquires B,  B can take the options ofA and the score Siis 100. 
 
• Both PA and PB have  some options: 
 
 In this case, for merging A and B with cross certification, Si is calculatedas the ratio of 
sum  of the partial results of  the options to themaximum number of options from both sides 
as in equation (2). 
 
Si = 
∑
 ("#$%&'()*+,(-.(/01,			"#$%&'()*+,(-.(/31	1
 (2) 
 
 If A acquires B, the sum is divided by the number of options of PA as shown in  in equ-
ation (3). 
 
Si = 
∑
"#$%&'()*+,(-.(/01	
    (3) 
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5.3  Overall CPs compatibility Score 
Let us consider the certificate policies CPA and CPBthat belong to the organizations A and B 
respectively.Let us also consider that A is the comparing organization, and, therefore, it is the 
onethat sets the criteria for the CPs comparison (or else the one that decides aboutpossible 
compatibility with B). This means that, the CPs comparison is actually theassessment of CPB 
against CPAusing the specific criteria of A. 
 
The overall compatibility score(total score) of CPB against CPA is extracted as aweighted aver-
age of all CP paragraphs scorings, as in equation (4): 
 
C =∑	(45∗751∑75      (4) 
 
where C defines the overall compatibility score of CPB against CPA, Widefines theweight of CP 
paragraph Pi and Sidefines the scoring for CP paragraph Pi. Theaddition ∑(Si *Wi) is the 
weighted compatibility score for the two CPs, whereas∑Wi is the maximum possible overall 
compatibility score of the two CPs. 
The total score can also be calculated using equation (5): 
 
C  =  ∑45"       (5) 
 
where N is the number of paragraphs. 
 
5.4 Keywords 
 
Some keywords are also helpful to prepare the Certificate Policy. The proposed key words in-
troduced in RFC 2119[30] are MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRE, SHALL, SHALL NOT, REC-
OMMENDED and MAY / OPTIONAL.  
 
Only few of the proposed keywords are used in the implementation. They are:  MUST, REC-
OMMENDED, OPTIONAL, and NOT. 
 
The options of a paragraph can look like: KEYWORD phrase 
 
 
 
 
Basically the keywords are interpreted by numerical values between 0 and 1. 
 
 MUST   1.0 
 RECOMMENDED 0.8 
 OPTIONAL  0.5 
 NOT   0.0 
 
Since these values are fuzzy in nature, we can get a token score from Fuzzy Logic[31].The idea 
is that, the score should not be 0 or 100 strictly, it shall be possible to getscores in between 0 
and 100. Fuzzy logic gives a degree of truth, which is between 0 and 1. Toadopt this idea, the 
degree of similarity of the keywords will be taken.The keyword values have certain meanings. 
"MUST" indicates an absolute necessaryoption and has the value 1.0. On the other side, "NOT" 
with 0.0 indicates a non-desired option. "OPTIONAL" means, the option may or may not occur 
and has the value 0.5. "RECOMMENDED" is closer to "MUST" than to "OPTIONAL", so the 
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value is 0.8. Thekeywords and their values provide an exact determination of equality and a 
betterexpression of the need of a certain option. They also state a kind of degree of truth. Ifthe 
same option is found at both paragraphs PA andPB, and the keywords are similar,like “MUST" 
and "RECOMMENDED", then the paragraph score is high. Therefore the difference in the 
keywords will be subtracted by 1 and the result is multiplied with100 (score of equality).  
 
 
5.5 Connectives with Options 
 
Connectives like, OR and AND can be used with options. With an OR connective, we choose 
one option out of many. It is mathematically represented as the maximum value of the provi-
sional scores of the equal options as in equation (6). 
 
Si = Max(89: ∗ (1 − <=9 − =:<11   (6) 
 
With an AND connective,  all the options have to be chosen. So it has to be determined that 
how many options are equal with what degree. The score can be calculated as in equation (7) 
 
  Si = 
∑∗(>?|A?A|1
 ("#$%&'()*+,(-.(/01,			"#$%&'()*+,(-.(/311
  (7) 
 
The equation (7) refers to the policies that should be merged with cross certification. If A ac-
quires B, the denominator is the number of options of PA, because B has to adapt to A. There-
fore the number of options of B are irrelevant as in equation (8).  
 
    Si = 
∑∗(>?|A?A|1
"#$%&'()*+,(-.(/01
   (8) 
 
For example, consider the options in the paragraphs PA and PBas shown below: 
PA     PB 
a) MUST a   a) RECOMMENDED a 
b) MUST b   b) OPTIONAL b 
c) MUST c   c) RECOMMENDED d 
    d) RECOMMENDED e 
 
Suppose the connection is OR, then both for merging as well as acquisition of companies, 
 
Si=Max{100*(1-(1.0-0.8)), 100*(1-(1.0-0.5)), …, 0} = 80 
 
Suppose the connection is AND and the requirement is that A and B are to be merged with cross 
certification, then 
 
Si= 80/4+50/4+0+0=32.5 
 
Suppose the connection is AND and A acquires B, then 
Si =80/3+50/3+0=43.3 
 
5.6 Final acceptance rules 
 
The final acceptance rules are set by the comparing organization and are those thatdetermine 
whether the foreign CP can be accepted or rejected, after the CPs comparison has been per-
formed. Examples of such rules, could be a combination of statementslike: "the overall CP 
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compatibility score should be over 90%", "partial compatibilityin paragraph X should be over 
80%" etc. It is also possible to set as only final acceptance rule that the partial CP compatibility 
in one (or more) paragraph is 100%,which means that a foreign CP may be rejected solely be-
cause of incompatibility in this specific paragraph. Based on this information, the final accep-
tance rules canreflect any acceptance or rejection policy that the comparing organization wants 
tofollow and, thus, make the method very flexible to different needs and requirements. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The certificate policy indicates the PKI certificates' profile and the architectural structure of the 
underlying trusted third party. Thus a certificate authority issues a certificate to an end user 
upon a specific certificate policy. If different end users with different domains want to establish 
a secure communication, they need to find a wayhow they can trust each other. That means 
their certificates need to follow the samestandard. This paper presents a novel method for com-
parison  and assessment of Certificate Policies for their unification during merger and acquisi-
tion of companies. The final acceptance rules are set by the comparing organization and are 
those that determine whether the foreign CP can be accepted or rejected after the CPs compari-
son has been performed. Unification of CPs is allowed only if the compatibility score satisfies 
the final acceptance rule. 
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